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ASSISTANCE REVISITED 
HOWARD BURGOYNE RHODES* 
ABSTRACT 
Twenty years ago, the Alaska Bar Association adopted Ethics Opinion No. 
93-1 which permitted attorneys to “ghostwrite” pleadings and provide other 
undisclosed services to pro se litigants. The goal of this ethical guidance was 
to enable attorneys to assist low-income individuals who could not otherwise 
afford representation. Ethics Opinion No. 93-1 construed “ghostwriting” 
broadly as an attorney’s undisclosed assistance to a pro se client whether by 
providing legal advice or drafting pleadings or other documents. This Note 
argues that, despite the moral allure of its theoretical justifications, 
ghostwriting is unnecessary, provides little demonstrable benefit to pro se 
litigants, and potentially conceals the unethical practice of law. Ghostwriting 
may also confuse the interactions between judges and pro se litigants in a 
way that works against the pro se party’s interests. Specifically, this Note 
argues that ghostwriting may cause judges to misapprehend pro se litigants’ 
legal understanding and to withdraw prematurely the solicitude those judges 
are otherwise required to give. Therefore, the Alaska Bar Association should 
revise its guidance on ghostwriting to require attorneys providing unbundled 
services to append their Alaska Bar Number on their submissions. This 
requirement would discourage abuses, enable judges effectively to manage pro 
se litigants, and still permit experimentation in the unbundled legal market.  
INTRODUCTION 
For several decades, Alaska’s bench and bar have debated how best 
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to respond to the increasing number of individuals who represent 
themselves in court because they believe the services of a lawyer are 
unaffordable, unavailable, or undesirable. Pro se litigants present a 
number of challenges to state court systems: they frequently have 
difficulty managing procedural requirements and articulating their legal 
claims; they require judges and courthouse staff to instruct them on 
basic matters that lawyers handle with dispatch; and they often drop-
out of or fail unnecessarily in the pursuit of justice due to a lack of 
knowledge and appropriate resources, thus creating a massive pool of 
unmet legal needs. The increasing number of such litigants, therefore, 
raises a question: can courts and the legal profession devise a way to 
provide these citizens with effective “access to justice” while 
maintaining a neutral and efficient tribunal and upholding the values of 
the legal profession? 
Twenty years ago, the Alaska Bar Association Ethics Committee led 
the State’s effort to respond to this problem by issuing Opinion No. 93-1 
(“Alaska Op. 93-1” or the “Opinion”).1 Alaska Op. 93-1 permitted 
attorneys to “ghostwrite” the filings of pro se litigants under certain 
conditions as a means of enabling attorneys to assist low-income 
individuals who could not otherwise afford full representation.2 The 
Opinion did not define “ghostwriting,” but seemed to construe it 
broadly as an attorney’s undisclosed assistance to a client who proceeds 
pro se, regardless of whether this assistance takes the form of writing 
pleadings or providing legal advice.3 In either case, the attorney neither 
enters an appearance in the litigation nor signs the documents he helps 
to prepare. The Opinion operated under an implicit assumption that a 
lawyer’s “ghostwriting” services to a pro se client would amount to less 
than traditional, full-service representation.4 In this respect, Alaska Op. 
93-1 anticipated by more than a decade the Alaska Supreme Court’s 
adoption of a revised Rule 1.2(c) of the Alaska Rules of Professional 
Conduct (“ARPC”), which officially permitted Alaska attorneys to limit 
 
 1.  Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Op. 93-1 (1993) [hereinafter Alaska Op. 
93-1], available at https://www.alaskabar.org/servlet/content/365.html. 
 2.  Id. at 1. 
 3.  See id. at 1–2 (discussing a lawyer’s provision of “legal services” and 
using classes taught by non-profit legal assistance organizations as an example). 
 4.  In the litigation context, full-service representation is typically defined 
as charging a client a single fee to handle all aspects of the litigation. Jeffrey P. 
Justman, Capturing the Ghost: Expanding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to Solve 
Procedural Concerns with Ghostwriting, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1246, 1247 n.6 (2008) 
(citing Helen Hierschbiel, The Ethics of Unbundling: How to Avoid the Land Mines 
of “Discrete Task Representation,” OR. ST. B. BULL (July 2007), available at 
http://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/07jul/barcounsel.html). 
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the scope of their representation of clients.5 
Since 1993, Alaska has used a two-pronged approach to address the 
challenges of increased pro se litigation: (1) providing direct 
administrative assistance to such litigants, at least in the area of family 
law, and (2) formally encouraging attorneys to provide “unbundled” 
legal services that are more affordable for low-income clients.6 The 
Alaska Court System provides direct assistance through its Family Law 
Self-Help Center (“FLSHC”), which supplies forms, instructions, and 
neutral administrative guidance.7 The FLSHC also refers clients to the 
Alaska Bar Association’s list of lawyers who provide unbundled legal 
services.8  
The basic terms for providing unbundled services are set by ARCP 
Rule 1.2(c), which states that “[a] lawyer may limit the scope of the 
representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances 
and the client consents after consultation.”9 Lawyers who provide 
unbundled legal services modify the terms of the traditional attorney-
client relationship with respect to litigation by creating a contract to 
complete discrete tasks for a client on a fee-for-service basis rather than 
charging a retainer fee for managing an entire case.10 Such unbundled 
 
 5.  See ALASKA S. CT. ORDER NO. 1544. 
 6.  See Pro Se Resources by State, AM. B. ASS’N, 
http://americanbar.org/groups/delivery_legal_services/resources/pro_se_unb
undling_resource_center/pro_se_resources_by_state.html (last updated Dec. 14, 
2011) (outlining limited representation and family-law self-service centers as the 
two options available); Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at 1 (encouraging attorneys 
to cooperate with organizations providing unbundled services). 
 7.  Self-Help Center: Family Law, ALASKA CT. SYS., http://courts.alaska.gov/ 
selfhelp.htm (last updated Aug. 9, 2013). According to the FLSHC’s Director, 
Stacey Marz, the Center receives an average of 7,500 client contacts every year. 
Telephone Interview with Stacey Marz, Dir., Family Law Self-Help Ctr. (May 14, 
2013). 
 8.  Finding a Lawyer, ALASKA CT. SYS., 
http://courts.alaska.gov/shclawyer.htm (last updated July 15, 2003). 
 9.  ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c); see ALASKA S. CT. ORDER NO. 
1544 (effective Oct. 15, 2004) (officially emending ARPC R. 1.2(c) to require that 
the limitation be reasonable under the circumstances and subject to the consent 
of the client and emending Alaska R. Civ. P. 81 to permit the “limited 
appearance by counsel”). The ARPC were rescinded in their entirety and new 
rules adopted in 2009, but Rule 1.2(c) was unchanged. ALASKA S. CT. ORDER NO. 
1680 (effective Apr. 15, 2009). 
 10.  Unbundled Legal Services – Information, ALASKA BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.alaskabar.org/servlet/content/unbundled_legal_services_1246.ht
ml (last visited Oct. 11, 2013); Stephanie Kimbro, Law a la Carte: The Case for 
Unbundling Legal Services, GP SOLO, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/ 
gp_solo/2012/september_october/law_a_la_carte_case_unbundling_legal_servi
ces.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2013); Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice? Case 
Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbundled Legal Services, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & 
POL’Y 453, 454 (2011). Unbundled services are only truly novel in the litigation 
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services purport to address problems of under-representation by 
providing limited services for limited cost, thus “servicing clients within 
their ability to pay.”11  
Unbundled services bear a clear—though controversial— 
relationship to the goal of providing greater legal support for low-
income persons. What is less clear is why a state bar or court system 
should permit attorneys providing those services to do so from behind a 
veil of anonymity. The Alaska courts have never addressed 
ghostwriting, but federal courts that have opined on the issue have been 
almost uniformly critical of the practice.12 Critics of ghostwriting suggest 
both that it is contrary to various rules of professional conduct and that 
it undermines some of the fundamental requirements of a self-regulating 
profession, such as transparency and responsibility. 
This Note argues that the Alaska Bar Association should revise its 
guidance in Alaska Op. 93-1 to disentangle the ability of an attorney to 
provide unbundled services from the ethical license to remain 
anonymous. Specifically, this Note asserts that the Alaska Bar should 
amend its current guidance to require that any attorney-assisted filing 
be explicitly identified as such (e.g., by appending “Prepared with the 
Assistance of Counsel” along with the attorney’s Alaska Bar number), 
though the attorney’s name need not be disclosed. This would bring the 
Alaska Bar’s ethical guidelines into conformity with the opinions of the 
Florida,13 New Hampshire,14 and New York City15 bar associations. The 
recent action of the Florida Bar Association deserves special 
consideration because it is the only state bar to reverse its position on 
 
arena. See id. at 461 n.32 (citing Fern Fisher-Brandveen & Rochelle Klempner, 
Unbundled Legal Services: Untying the Bundle in New York State, 29 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1107, 1108–09 (2002)) (noting that “unbundled legal services” are not new 
except in the litigation arena). 
 11.  See Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling Legal Services: Servicing Clients within 
Their Ability to Pay, 40 JUDGES’ J. 15, 15–16 (2001) (noting popular belief that 
lawyers are unaffordable and that unbundling can make legal services 
affordable). 
 12.  See Ira P. Robbins, Ghostwriting: Filling in the Gaps of Pro Se Prisoners’ 
Access to the Courts, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 285 n.73 (2010) (collecting cases 
critical of the practice). 
 13.  Florida State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 79-7 
(Reconsideration) (2000) [hereinafter Florida Op. 79-7], available at 
http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBETOpin.nsf/ca2dcdaa853ef7b88525672800
4f87db/8cbbba193ca2133185256b2f006cac97?OpenDocument. 
 14.  N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Unbundled Services – Assisting the Pro Se 
Litigant, N.H. B. ASS’N, (May 12, 1999), available at http://www.nhbar.org/pdfs/ 
PEA5-99.pdf. 
 15.  Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial 
Ethics, Formal Op. 1987-2 (1987), available at http://www2.nycbar.org/Ethics/ 
eth1987-2.htm. 
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ghostwriting after holding an inquiry of county court judges in the 
state.16 
In support of this view, this Note advances three main arguments: 
(1) a lawyer’s ability to provide unbundled legal services to low-income 
clients—and thus, theoretically, increase “access to justice”—does not 
depend upon his ability to remain undisclosed; (2) ghostwriting has 
shown little demonstrable benefit to pro se litigants and may actually 
hinder a judge’s ability to manage her obligations to pro se litigants 
effectively; and (3) ghostwriting’s marginal benefits do not outweigh its 
potential costs to professional integrity. 
I. ALASKA OP. 93-1, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, AND THE RISE OF PRO SE 
LITIGATION 
The Alaska Bar Association’s ethics opinions are initiated in 
response to inquiries from Alaska attorneys who confront novel or 
unclear ethical issues in their practices.17 Alaska Op. 93-1 was drafted in 
response to an inquiry from a family law attorney who had a large 
number of low-income clients who needed professional assistance with 
child support modification motions and could not afford to retain 
counsel.18 The attorney inquired whether it was ethical to provide this 
limited service without entering an appearance in the litigation.19 Alaska 
Op. 93-1 does not indicate how much the attorney was paid for this 
service, nor whether the service was offered singly or as part of a menu 
of services from which the client could choose as the litigation 
progressed.20 Nevertheless, the Alaska Bar Ethics Committee concluded 
that as long as an attorney clearly informed her client of the limitations 
and risks of limited legal services, and conducted herself in accordance 
with all the relevant standards of professional conduct, she need not 
disclose her role in preparing filings to the court.21 The Alaska Bar Board 
of Governors adopted the opinion in March of 1993. 
Alaska Op. 93-1 and the situation to which it responded were not, 
of course, conceived in a vacuum. Since the 1970s, the Alaska Bar, along 
with every other state bar in the country, has dealt with an increasing 
number of pro se litigants entering the court system. Studies from the 
1990s note dramatic numbers of such litigants, especially in the context 
 
 16.  See Florida Ethics Op. 79-7, supra note 13 (reversing previous position). 
 17.  Telephone Interview with Steve Van Goor, Bar Counsel, Alaska Bar 
Ass’n (Feb. 7, 2013). 
 18.  Id.; Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at 1. 
 19.  Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at 1. 
 20.  See id. (not addressing pay or the menu issue). 
 21.  Id. 
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of family law.22 More recent data from Anchorage courts handling 
family law cases indicate similar numbers. Since 2009, for example, 37 to 
43% of the contested divorce and custody cases in Anchorage courts had 
two unrepresented parties.23 In that same period, between 26 and 29% of 
these family law cases had only one represented party.24 Though reliable 
data is difficult to obtain, recent law review articles on pro se litigation 
suggest that, even outside the realm of family law, the number of 
unrepresented litigants nationally is rising.25 
This increase in the number of self-represented litigants casts doubt 
on whether the legal profession is adequately fulfilling its duty of 
meeting the public’s needs for legal services: a troublesome problem for 
state bar associations.26 Public-spirited members of the bar have long 
recognized the so-called “representation gap” between the poor and the 
well-off.27 Some commentators believe that the rise of pro se litigation is 
 
 22.  See Bruce D. Sales et al., Is Self-Representation a Reasonable Alternative to 
Attorney Representation in Divorce Cases?, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553, 571 n.82 (1993) 
(finding, based on figures from 1990, that in an Arizona family court 88.2% of 
divorce cases had one pro se litigant and 52% had both parties proceeding pro 
se). 
 23.  Telephone Interview with Stacey Marz, Dir., Family Law Self-Help Ctr. 
(May 14, 2013). 
 24.  Id. Mark Andrews’s contribution to this issue of the Alaska Law Review 
cites substantially similar data, relying upon Katherine Alteneder, Literacy and 
the Courts, 24 ALASKA JUST. F. 1 (2007), available at 
justice.uaa.alaska.edu/forum/24/2summer2007/242.summer2007.pdf. See Mark 
Andrews, Duties of the Judicial System to Pro Se Litigants, 30 ALASKA L. REV. 189, 
189–90 (2013). The fact that the available data from the Family Law Self-Help 
Center has remained steady since at least 2007 suggests that the number of pro 
se litigants is perhaps no longer increasing. 
 25.  See Alteneder, supra note 24, at 1 (noting, without citing data, an increase 
in the number of self represented litigants in Alaska); Lois Bloom & Helen 
Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475, 479 (2002) (explaining that filings in federal 
courts have increased dramatically and that a significant percentage of those 
filings involve pro se litigants). See also Ronald W. Staudt & Paula L. Hannaford, 
Access to Justice for the Self-Represented Litigant: An Interdisciplinary Investigation by 
Designers and Lawyers, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1017, 1018 (2002) (commenting that 
filings by pro se litigants have increased in the past decade); Madelynn Herman, 
Pro Se Statistics, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS. ( Sept. 25, 2006), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20120504035215/http://www.ncsconline.org/wc
/publications/memos/prosestatsmemo.htm (providing more recent, but 
scattered, data). 
 26.  See John C. Rothermich, Ethical and Procedural Implications of 
“Ghostwriting” for Pro Se Litigants: Toward Increased Access to Civil Justice, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2687, 2689 (1999) (describing unbundled legal services as a 
suggested solution to the problem of unmet legal needs). 
 27.  See generally LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN 
AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW INCOME AMERICANS 
(2009), available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/docume 
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essentially a function of this gap. They view pro se litigants as reluctant 
participants in the legal system, going it alone because they cannot 
afford to pursue a legal solution to their problems in any other way.28 
But going it alone, they rarely succeed.29 As a response, many 
commentators argue that the American commitment to equal justice 
under the law demands that the legal profession develop new, 
unbundled ways of meeting low-income citizens’ needs at lower costs.30 
The reaction of state bars to the rise in self-represented litigation is 
also driven by economic considerations. Increased pro se litigation 
changes the legal marketplace, especially for attorneys providing legal 
services to individuals of modest means.31 On this view, more self-
representation means fewer clients.32 For these attorneys, the issue is not 
necessarily about “access to justice” or other ideals, but may instead be 
about their ability to unbundle their services so as to maintain their 
position in a changing marketplace.33 
 
nting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf (attempting to document the 
representation gap). 
 28.  Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme 
Forms of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1537, 
1542 (2005). This view is undoubtedly true in many cases, but not in all. See id. at 
1573–76 (providing an overview of the many other reasons why many litigants 
proceed pro se). 
 29.  See Michelle N. Struffolino, Taking Limited Representation to the Limits: The 
Efficacy of Using Unbundled Legal Services in Domestic-Relations Matters Involving 
Litigation, 2 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 166, 211–12 (2012) 
(describing the procedural difficulties of pro se litigation). There are no clear 
statistics on the rate of failure for pro se litigants as compared to represented 
litigants with similar claims. Litigants, of course, fail for all sorts of reasons. 
Nevertheless, it is widely believed that pro se litigants are less successful than 
represented ones. Judges used to speak about this frankly in terms of a self-
represented litigant’s right “to commit judicial suicide.” Burks v. State, 748 P.2d 
1178, 1183 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (Coats, J., dissenting). For reasons discussed 
below, this rhetoric is now out of favor, however accurate it might be in relation 
to actual consequences. 
 30.  See Steinberg, supra note 10, at 453–54 (“The provision of ‘unbundled’ 
legal aid has been this decade’s response to the severe shortage of lawyers 
available to represent poor litigants.”); see also Brenda Star Adams, Note, 
“Unbundled Legal Services”: A Solution to the Problems Caused by Pro Se Litigation in 
Massachusetts’s Civil Courts, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 303, 345–46, 348 (2005) 
(encouraging limited representation in Massachusetts to protect indigent 
litigants from having to pay more than they can afford and noting the author’s 
belief that “our system [is] one that provides justice for all its litigants, regardless 
of financial status”). 
 31.  See Adams, supra note 30, at 313–14 (describing pro se litigation’s impact 
on attorney demand). 
 32.  Id. at 304. However, there are currently no significant studies indicating 
whether the increase in self-representation has actually appreciably reduced the 
number of clients served by such lawyers. 
 33.  This was arguably less important in 1993, the year of Alaska Op. 93-1. 
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Against this background, the Alaska Bar Ethics Committee justified 
attorney ghostwriting primarily as a way of making legal services 
available to individuals in “poor financial conditions” who might not 
otherwise have effective access to the courts.34 The Ethics Committee 
recognized that ghostwriting could easily become a way for lawyers to 
provide unethical or incompetent services from behind the “veil [of] 
anonymity.”35 Therefore, in Alaska Op. 93-1, the Ethics Committee 
exhorts lawyers who might provide these services to abide by all ethical 
rules and professional canons. The Opinion asserts that a lawyer 
providing limited or undisclosed services still must provide her client 
with high-quality work.36 Her agreement to provide such services 
creates a lawyer-client relationship like any other, with all of its 
attendant duties.37 For example, if the attorney assists the pro se litigant 
in the preparation of documents that the attorney could not ethically 
sign, then the attorney has violated her obligation not to act unethically 
through the act of another.38 
Alaska Op. 93-1 gestures at many of the relevant issues of 
professional responsibility surrounding ghostwriting, but does not 
address some of the most difficult questions, like whether there is a limit 
to the extent attorneys may assist a client before they are required to 
disclose their participation. Consequently, the Opinion’s brief and 
generalized treatment of the issue has been subject to several 
misinterpretations. For instance, Alaska Op. 93-1 apparently suggests 
that attorney ghostwriting is properly limited to filings other than 
pleadings and motions. This is the interpretation of the American Bar 
Association’s (“ABA”) Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility, which has interpreted attorney ghostwriting in Alaska as 
requiring disclosure unless the “lawyer merely helped fill out forms 
 
Today, an increasing number of individuals use private document preparation 
services rather than hiring an attorney. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE 
DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., AN ANALYSIS OF RULES THAT ENABLE LAWYERS TO SERVE 
PRO SE LITIGANTS: A WHITE PAPER 5, 11 (2009) (noting the need for the 
professional rules to enable a “lawyer to limit his or her services and to compete 
with those who provide only legal information,” such as a legal self-help 
website). 
 34.  Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at 1. Alaska has also established a lawyer’s 
role in promoting “access to the legal system.” ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
pmbl. 
 35.  Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at 1 n.1. 
 36.  Id. at 1; see also ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2, cmt. 7 (“[A]n 
agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty 
to provide competent representation.”). 
 37.  Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at 1. 
 38.  Id. at 1 n.1. The relevant rule is now ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
8.4(a). 
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designed for pro se litigants.”39 The Advisory Committee on 
Professional Ethics for the Supreme Court of New Jersey embraced a 
similar interpretation by lumping Alaska Op. 93-1 in with state bar 
opinions that require disclosure only when a “requisite quantum of aid” 
has been given to the pro se litigant.40 
What these interpretations identify as a rather restrictive ethics 
opinion prohibiting undisclosed attorney assistance with pleadings is, 
upon a closer reading, a very expansive allowance for the undisclosed 
assistance of counsel.41 In an endnote to Alaska Op. 93-1, the Ethics 
Committee states its awareness that “attorneys may get involved in 
preparing pleadings and filings for clients outside the area of domestic 
relations, and for purposes which are not as worthy.”42 Though this 
sentence implies that pleadings in some contexts may be less worthy, it 
is not intended to suggest that preparing pleadings in an undisclosed 
manner is itself unworthy or contrary to the rule. In fact, the text of the 
Opinion repeatedly discusses preparing pleadings as one of the tasks 
that may be undisclosed and cites as support a Virginia Ethics Opinion 
permitting a lawyer to prepare “discovery requests, pleadings or briefs 
without entering an appearance.”43 While the authors of Alaska Op. 93-1 
clearly believed that the practice of ghostwriting filings should be 
limited, they did not provide ethical guidelines for determining the 
proper scope of that practice. They simply stated that an attorney who 
prepares or assists in the preparation of a pleading signed by a pro se 
litigant is “under the same ethical constraints as if [she] were to sign the 
pleading with [her] own name.”44 
Some of the confusion surrounding the interpretation of Alaska Op. 
93-1 is undoubtedly due to the Opinion’s unspoken commitment to the 
 
 39.  ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446, at 1 
n.3 (2007) [hereinafter ABA Op. 07-446] (discussing undisclosed legal assistance 
to pro se litigants in various jurisdictions). 
 40.  N.J. Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 713, at 3–4 (2008). 
 41.  See Jona Goldschmidt, In Defense of Ghostwriting, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1145, 1166 n.120 (2001) (correctly identifying the expansive allowance for 
undisclosed assistance in Alaska Op. 93-1). 
 42.  Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at 1 n.1. 
 43.  Id. at 2; see Va. Legal Ethics Op. 1127 (1988), available at 
http://www.vacle.org/opinions/1127.htm. Note that Alaska Op. 93-1 
erroneously cites to Va. Op. 1129. 
 44.  Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at 1 n.1. This is a perplexingly broad 
suggestion, especially given that an attorney’s signature is often presumed to be 
ethically required, including under FED. R. CIV. P. 11. See Richard G. Johnson, 
Symposium: Happy (?) Birthday Rule 11: Integrating Legal Ethics & Professional 
Responsibility with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 819, 862–
64 (2004) (quoting Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1271–73 (10th Cir. 2010)) 
(noting the interplay between ghostwriting, the duty of candor, and Rule 11). 
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ethical legitimacy of unbundled legal services. Alaska Op. 93-1 directly 
defends the ability of a family law attorney to help a pro se client 
prepare a motion for child support modification without entering an 
appearance in the litigation (and thus, one assumes, without doing more 
for the client). The Opinion is written generally as a defense of 
undisclosed services, but is focused throughout on the goal of 
permitting attorneys to provide more services to low-income clients. In a 
sense, the real concern driving Alaska Op. 93-1 is permitting attorneys to 
serve clients according to the clients’ financial means without 
undermining the quality of those services or making them unaffordable. 
What Alaska Op. 93-1 never makes clear is why allowing an attorney, 
for example, to write a pro se client’s child support modification motion 
should entail allowing that attorney’s assistance to be undisclosed.45 
The idea of unbundled legal services has often been criticized as a 
threat to the ethical demands of competency and zealousness in 
representation, as well as to the attorney’s duty to avoid frivolous 
claims.46 In its most persuasive form, the argument against unbundled 
services is twofold. First, the professional rules are grounded in a form 
of relationship (full-service representation) that encourages and 
incentivizes compliance with those rules. And second, limiting the 
“attorney-client relationship” by unbundling legal services deprives 
many of the professional rules of this grounding. A lawyer who 
provides unbundled services completes a limited task, based on limited 
contact with the client, for a limited fee. In this situation, the limited fee 
provides the attorney with little material incentive to spend the requisite 
amount of time and effort to comply with ARPC 1.1 (demanding 
competent legal services) and ARPC 3.1 (prohibiting frivolous claims). 
Some critics have also highlighted the lack of continuity in 
attorney-client relationships based on unbundled services.47 This lack of 
continuity potentially deprives the attorney-client relationship of the 
ongoing interaction that fosters loyalty and the attendant zeal in 
advocacy. ARPC 1.16, which sets limitations on how and under what 
 
 45.  Steve Van Goor, current ethics counsel to the Alaska Bar Association, 
has acknowledged that, to his recollection, little attention was paid in the debate 
over Alaska Op. 93-1 to exactly why non-disclosure was important to the 
broader justification of increasing access to justice. Telephone Interview with 
Steve Van Goor, Bar Counsel, Alaska Bar Ass’n (Feb. 7, 2013). 
 46.  See Richard Zorza, Re-Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Legal Ethics 
and Technological Innovation in Legal Practice: From Threat to Opportunity, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2659, 2665 (1999) (noting critics’ concerns about competency 
and zeal). 
 47.  See id. at 2667 (“Traditional ethical rules place—or at least appear to 
place—a high value on continuity of representation . . . . Critics claim that partial 
service models implicitly or explicitly violate those rules.”). 
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conditions an attorney may withdraw from representation, inscribes a 
desire for continuity in the attorney-client relationship, especially over 
the course of a single litigation.48 The explicit concern of ARPC 1.16 is to 
prevent an attorney from leaving a client in the lurch in a manner 
detrimental to his or her interests. However, the concern with continuity 
also encourages an attorney to provide competent services by fostering a 
personal relationship that can deepen the lawyer’s commitment to the 
client’s cause.49 
Since the revision of ARPC 1.2(c) in 2004, the debate in Alaska over 
unbundled services has largely been settled. Proponents of unbundled 
services trust that, in concert with the other rules of professional 
conduct, ARPC 1.2(c)’s requirement that any contractual limitations on 
representation be “reasonable” and subject to the client’s informed 
consent will prevent abuses. These proponents, even outside of Alaska, 
believe that the potential gains promised by unbundled services in 
meeting the unmet legal needs of low-income citizens outweigh the 
costs of potential abuses by attorneys who offer such services in an 
incompetent or irresponsible manner.50 To date, the Alaska courts and 
the Alaska Bar Association have never sanctioned an attorney for 
abusing the terms of unbundled services. But this fact does not suggest 
that such abuses have not occurred, nor that they will not occur in the 
future when such services likely become more common.51 Given that the 
 
 48.  See id. (noting limitations on an attorney’s freedom to withdraw from 
representation). 
 49.  See id. (explaining how partial focus can lead to less competent work and 
explaining that concerns about continuity derive in part from concerns about 
competence). 
 50.  See Rothermich, supra note 26, at 2720, 2728 (noting how “abuses . . . 
might arise when attorneys offer ghostwriting assistance without at least some 
investigation of their pro se clients’ allegations,” but concluding that “[c]ourts 
and bar associations should make every effort to avoid stifling the development 
of these new models of legal practice” because “such models are providing more 
legal assistance to more people, incrementally increasing access to civil justice”). 
 51.  See Letter from Sheldon Schwartz, County Court Judge, Dade County, 
Florida, to Elizabeth Tarbert, Ethics Counsel, Florida Bar (March 1, 1999) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Schwartz Letter] (“At one time, the practice of law was 
a [truly] honorable profession and unfortunately recently it has become more of 
a business enterprise.”). Judge Schwartz does not elaborate on his meaning in 
this letter. It is reasonable to infer, however, that he does not regard public-
spirited lawyers who conscientiously assist low-income clients as the culprits of 
abuses of ghostwritten assistance. The problems of ghostwritten assistance, he 
seems to suggest, become clear when enterprising lawyers take the money of 
low-income citizens to provide low-quality work that does not actually benefit 
the client because the client cannot understand it nor successfully use it in court. 
The opinions of Florida county court judges on this issue will be discussed in 
greater detail below. 
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Alaska courts apply a quite forgiving standard to pro se filings,52 they 
are unlikely to notice a pro se filing that is ghostwritten in an 
incompetent manner by an attorney. They would likely simply assume 
that it is another incompetent effort by a pro se litigant. In such a 
situation, the Alaska Bar would still have an interest in protecting the 
integrity of the profession against an attorney who took money from a 
client to produce a product that is potentially indistinguishable from 
what a smart pro se litigant could produce himself. Given the potential 
for abuse within the limits currently set by Rule 1.2(c), the question 
becomes whether the ethical license to ghostwrite for pro se clients adds 
something of clear value to the enterprise of expanding legal services 
that is worth the potential cost. 
II. ALASKA OP. 93-1 AND THE NATIONAL DEBATE OVER 
GHOSTWRITING 
In beginning to think about how Alaska Op. 93-1 might be revised 
in order to address misunderstandings and unanswered questions, it is 
useful to consider the Opinion in relation to both the federal case law 
and the ethics opinions of other states. To a great extent, the courts and 
state bar associations have been at an impasse on the acceptability of 
attorney ghostwriting. The federal courts have largely condemned the 
practice, while many state bar associations—and, recently, the American 
Bar Association itself—have embraced it. At the federal level, the list of 
condemnatory cases is impressive.53 In one of the most frequently cited 
 
 52.  See Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987) (stating that pleadings 
of pro se litigants should be held to a lower standard than pleadings done by 
lawyers). 
 53.  See Robbins, supra note 12, at 285 (noting that federal courts have almost 
universally condemned ghostwriting); see, e.g., Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 
1272–73 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that ghostwriting constitutes a 
“misrepresentation to this court”); Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 
1971) (“If a brief is prepared in any substantial part by a member of the bar, it 
must be signed by him.”); Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Emps. of 
Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, at *14–16 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007) 
(holding that undisclosed ghostwriting violates several ethics rules and the spirit 
of FED. R. CIV. P. 11); Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 884, 887 (D. 
Kan. 1997) (requiring pro se defendant to disclose whether she was represented 
by an attorney); Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 
1075, 1077 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“[T]he Court considers it improper for lawyers to 
draft or assist in drafting complaints or other documents submitted to the Court 
on behalf of litigants designated as pro se.”); United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 966 
F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“Important policy considerations militate 
against validating an arrangement wherein a party appears pro se while in 
reality the party is receiving legal assistance from a licensed attorney.”); Johnson 
v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1232 (D. Colo. 1994), aff’d in part, 
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cases, Johnson v. Board of County Commissioners for County of Fremont,54 the 
court condemned ghostwriting as a violation of both Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the applicable standards of 
professional ethics.55 Quoting one of the earliest cases to address the 
subject, the district court stated: 
What we fear is that in some cases actual members of the bar 
represent petitioners,  informally or otherwise, and prepare 
briefs for them which the assisting lawyers do not sign, and 
thus escape the obligation imposed on members of the bar, 
typified by F.R.Civ.P. 11, but which exists in all cases, criminal 
as well as civil, of representing to the court that there is good 
ground to support the assertions made. We cannot approve of 
such a practice. If a brief is prepared in any substantial part by 
a member of the bar, it must be signed by him. We reserve the 
right, where a brief gives occasion to believe that the petitioner 
has had legal assistance, to require such signature, if such, 
indeed, is the fact.56 
The court in Johnson also argued that ghostwriting is a form of 
misrepresentation to the court, claiming that it violates what is now 
Model Rule 8.4(c), which prohibits conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation.57 
Beyond the specific concern with Rule 11, many of the federal 
courts have expressed concern that when an attorney ghostwrites a pro 
se litigant’s filings the attorney allows the litigant to take unfair 
advantage of the court’s leniency toward pro se litigants or otherwise 
 
disapproved in part, 85 F.3d 489 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Having a litigant appear to be 
pro se when in truth an attorney is authoring pleadings and necessarily guiding 
the course of the litigation with an unseen hand is ingenuous [sic] to say the 
least; it is far below the level of candor which must be met by members of the 
bar.”); In re Brown, 354 B.R. 535, 545 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2006) (footnote omitted) 
(“[I]f an attorney writes a pleading, he or she has a duty to make sure that the 
Court knows he or she wrote it. The Court is not required to play a game of 
‘catch-me-if-you-can’ with a ghostwriter. All counsel owe a duty of candor to 
every court in which they appear. Inherent in that duty is the requirement that 
counsel disclose his or her involvement in the case.”); In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 
767 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003) (“[T]he Court recognizes the act of ghost-writing as a 
violation of Local Rule 9010-1(d) and in contravention of the policies and 
procedures set forth in the South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Ostrovsky v. Monroe (In re Ellingson), 230 
B.R. 426, 435 n.12 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1999) (holding that court rules, particularly 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11, as well as the then-current ABA Standing Comm. Op. 1414, 
prohibiting ghostwriting). 
 54.  868 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1994). 
 55.  Id. at 1231. 
 56.  Id. at 1231–32 (quoting Ellis, 448 F.2d at 1328). 
 57.  Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1232. 
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causes undue confusion or inefficiency.58 In Johnson, the court discussed 
an attorney’s ghostwritten assistance as an “unseen hand” guiding the 
course of litigation to the detriment of the opposing party.59 Few courts, 
however, would read this negative “unseen hand” metaphor to include 
very limited forms of assistance, such as advising a friend about how he 
might proceed with a given legal matter. In Ricotta v. California,60 the 
court attempted to draw the line between innocuous forms of limited 
assistance and forms of assistance that have a detrimental impact on 
judicial proceedings. The court stated: 
Attorneys cross the line . . . when they gather and anonymously 
present legal arguments, with the actual and constructive 
knowledge that the work will be presented in  some similar 
form in a motion before the Court. With such participation the 
attorney guides the course of litigation while standing in the 
shadows of the Courthouse door.61 
In addition, some courts believe that attorneys who work behind 
the “cloak of anonymity” evade the effective enforcement of the rules of 
professional conduct, thus depriving their clients of one important 
avenue of redress in the event of attorney negligence or misconduct.62 
 Twenty-four states have addressed the issue of whether to permit 
attorney ghostwriting.63 According to the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, these state opinions can be 
grouped into roughly three categories.64 The first group finds that 
attorneys have no duty to disclose assistance to a pro se client as long as 
they provide that assistance ethically and competently and violate no 
court rules.65 Alaska Op. 93-1, which was among the first state bar ethics 
 
 58.  See, e.g., Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1077–78 (stating that 
ghostwriting unfairly allows pro se parties to benefit from legal help and be held 
to a less stringent standard simultaneously). 
 59.  Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1232. 
 60.  4 F. Supp. 2d. 961 (S.D. Cal 1998). 
 61.  Id. at 987. 
 62.  In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 768 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003). 
 63.  Robbins, supra note 12, at 286 n.80 (citing Maryland Legal Assistance 
Network, Informal National Survey of Ethical Opinions Related to “Discrete Task 
Lawyering” (2003), http://www.unbundledlaw.org/thinking/ethicsurvey.htm). 
 64.  New Jersey Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics Op. 713, at 2–3 (2008). 
 65.  See id. at 3 (stating that some ethics opinions find no duty to disclose 
limited representation). See also N.M. R. of Prof’l Conduct R. 16-303 cmt. 15 
(2008); Cal. R. Ct. 3.37(a) (2007); Minn. State Bar Ass’n Pro Se Implementation 
Comm., Final Report (2006); N.C. State Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 
2005-10 (2006); Ariz. State Bar Ethics Op. on Rule 05-06 (2005); D.C. Bar Ass’n 
Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 330 (2005); Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1; Me. State Bar 
Ass’n, Ethics Op. 89 (1988); Utah State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 74 (1981). 
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opinions to address this issue,66 falls into this first group.67 The second 
group prohibits the practice outright.68 The third group imposes a 
limited duty of disclosure, sometimes by using an “imprecise” 
demarcation based on the “requisite quantum of aid.”69 
Recently, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 07-446 (“ABA Op. 07-446”) which 
supersedes its earlier guidance on the issue and attempts to lead state 
bar organizations toward a more open embrace of ghostwriting. ABA 
Op. 07-446 makes the obligation to disclose contingent on whether “the 
fact of assistance is material to the matter” involved in the litigation.70 In 
most instances, of course, this would not be the case. The fact that an 
attorney provides ghostwritten assistance will rarely be material to a 
client’s substantive legal dispute. Thus, the ABA opinion suggests that 
in almost all cases there is no duty to disclose.71 
In a recent case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals discussed 
ABA Op. 07-446 in the context of a case about whether to censure an 
attorney for ghostwriting.72 The Second Circuit did not directly express 
an opinion on whether the practice violated an attorney’s professional 
obligations or court rules, but simply noted the split among the state 
bars and court opinions.73 In the light of this widespread disagreement, 
the court decided that, at the very least, it is reasonable to believe that 
the attorney in question did not know that what she was doing was 
wrong or that disclosure was required.74 Accordingly, the court did not 
impose public censure for this conduct.75 Nevertheless, the court noted 
that the ABA’s new support for attorney ghostwriting likely indicated 
 
 66.  Preceding it were ABA Informal Op. 1414 (1978); Utah State Bar Ethics 
Comm., Op. 74 (1981); Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y.C. Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial 
Ethics, Op. 1987-2 (1987); Me. Bar Op. No. 89 (1988); Va. Legal Ethics Op. 1127 
(1988); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Ethics Op. 613 (1990). 
 67.  New Jersey Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics Op. 713, at 3–4. 
 68.  Robbins, supra note 12, at 287 n.83 (identifying ten states that expressly 
prohibit the practice). 
 69.  Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 98-5 (1998); Del. State Bar 
Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 1994-2 (1994); Fla. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on 
Prof’l Ethics, Op. 79-7 (2000); Ky. Bar Ass’n Op. E-343 (1991); Mass. Bar Ass’n 
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 98-1 (1998); N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., 
Unbundled Services—Assisting the Pro se Litigant (1999); Utah State Bar Ethics 
Comm., Op. 74 (1981). 
 70.  ABA Op. 07-446, supra note 39. 
 71.  See id. (stating that the fact that a litigant who submitted papers on a pro 
se basis had received legal assistance is not material to the litigation’s merits). 
 72.  See In re Liu, 664 F.3d 367, 371 (2d Cir. 2011) (discussing ABA Op. 07-
446). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 372–73. 
 75.  Id. at 373. 
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the future direction of the debate.76 “Because most states look to the 
ABA Model Rules when adopting and amending their own rules of 
professional conduct, the coming years may see a number of courts and 
states take a more relaxed stance on ghostwriting.”77 
While the Second Circuit opinion suggests a possible 
rapprochement between the courts and state bars over the issue of 
ghostwriting, a recent ethics opinion by the Florida State Bar Association 
suggests a different course for the future.78 In 1999, the Florida Bar 
Association Committee on Professional Ethics sent inquiries to county 
court judges in the State regarding an earlier bar ethics opinion 
defending ghostwriting.79 The earlier opinion stated that “[i]t is not 
uncommon for a lawyer to offer limited services in assisting a party in 
the drafting of papers while stopping short of representing the party as 
attorney of record. Under these circumstances, there is no ethical 
impropriety if the attorney fails to sign the pleadings.”80 Almost 
unanimously, the county court judges responded that the permissive 
stance toward “ghosted pleadings” should be reversed.81 In response, 
the Florida Bar issued a Reconsideration of Florida Opinion 79-7, 
requiring that “[a]ny pleadings or other papers prepared by an attorney 
for a pro se litigant and filed with the court must indicate ‘Prepared with 
the Assistance of Counsel.’”82 
The Florida county court judges offered various reasons why they 
believed the practice of ghostwriting should end or at least be modified 
to include some form of disclosure. Several of them believed that the 
practice simply did not help pro se litigants.83 These judges reported that 
the pro se litigants who receive this limited assistance of counsel come 
before the court with (poorly-drafted) documents they do not 
understand and cannot adequately explain.84 This, of course, is a 
 
 76.  Id. at 371. 
 77.  Robbins, supra note 12, at 290. 
 78.  See Florida Op. 79-7, supra note 13 (requiring all documents prepared 
with assistance of counsel and filed with the court to clearly reflect the 
participation of an attorney). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. (excerpting the original Florida Op. 79-7). 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  See, e.g., Letter of Charles G. Cofer, County Court Judge, Duval County, 
Florida, to Elizabeth Tarbert, Florida Bar Ethics Counsel (March 9, 1999) 
[hereinafter Cofer Letter] (on file with author); Letter of Michael Samuels, 
County Court Judge, Dade County, Florida, to Elizabeth Tarbert, Florida Bar 
Ethics Counsel (March 3, 1999) [hereinafter Samuels Letter] (on file with author). 
 84.  See Samuels Letter, supra note 82; Schwartz Letter, supra note 51 
(complaining of pro se litigants who “come before the court [and] are not 
properly prepared and have not been properly counseled and often have filed 
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criticism of unbundled legal services in general, not only of undisclosed 
assistance. From the perspective of one county judge, however, the 
problem with ghostwriting is that it undermines the court’s ability “to 
monitor any abuses of the privilege which members of the bar have to 
assist pro se litigants.”85 Although this judge reported that the 
unbundled assistance of attorneys often results “in individuals coming 
before [him] who have either misconstrued the advice given to them, or 
who have insufficient understanding of the advice to apply it 
appropriately in a courtroom setting,” he did not reject such assistance 
outright.86 Instead, he suggested that attorneys who help prepare the 
filings of pro se litigants should disclose that they have done so by 
appending a short statement to that effect and including the attorney’s 
state bar number.87 This disclosure would simultaneously enable the 
court to monitor for apparent abuses and discourage such abuses by the 
sheer fact that such monitoring is possible. 
Due in part to responses of the county judges, the Florida Bar 
Association decided that the theoretical benefits of attorney 
ghostwriting were outweighed by its costs.88 Florida Opinion 79-7 
(Reconsideration) is the only state bar opinion to reverse an earlier 
opinion based on the opinions of judicial actors. To some extent, judges 
who reject ghostwriting may be expressing their rather austere view of 
professional ethics without adequate concern for how the legal needs of 
low-income persons are going to be met.89 However, for many judges, 
“the effect of ghost-writing on the operation of [the c]ourt cannot be 
overemphasized.”90 From this perspective, the problem with 
ghostwriting is that it fails to do the very thing that proponents of the 
practice use to justify it: give pro se litigants more effective access to 
justice. 
III. ALASKA OP. 93-1 AND PRO SE ACCOMMODATION IN THE 
ALASKA COURTS 
The story of Florida Op. 79-7 is instructive for thinking about how 
the Alaska Bar Association could revisit many of the arguments of 
 
improper or inaccurate pleadings”) 
 85.  See Cofer Letter, supra note 82. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Florida Op. 79-7, supra note 13. 
 89.  See In re Mungo, 305 B.R. 762, 769 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2003) (emphasizing that 
ghostwriting is an act of “misrepresentation that violates an attorney’s duty and 
professional responsibility to provide the utmost candor toward the Court”). 
 90.  Id. at 770. 
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Alaska Op. 93-1. Pro se litigants who pay an attorney for an unbundled 
service must ultimately come before a judge and argue their cases. Some 
critics of ghostwriting worry that pro se litigants who have benefitted 
from the assistance of an attorney will have an unfair advantage in 
relation to the opposing (represented) party because the pro se litigant 
will receive both judicial leniency and professional help. It is possible, 
however, that the situation could be quite the opposite. If a pro se 
litigant presents ghostwritten documents, it could just as easily lead a 
judge to withdraw prematurely the kinds of special consideration that 
pro se litigants might require. Ghostwriting might confuse a judge’s 
already quite complicated task of discerning how to balance a pro se 
litigant’s needs with the judge’s obligation to remain impartial.91 
Alaska Op. 93-1 was conceived at a time when the Alaska courts 
were in the midst of their own effort to define how they would address 
the particular needs of pro se litigants while preserving the impartiality 
of the judicial forum. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Haines 
v. Kerner,92 which established a generous pleading standard for pro se 
litigants, the Alaska Supreme Court issued several opinions in the 1980s 
that continue to shape how Alaska judges manage these litigants.93 In 
Breck v. Ulmer,94 the Alaska Supreme Court followed Haines by declaring 
that judges must hold “the pleadings of pro se litigants . . . to less 
stringent standards than those of lawyers.”95 Breck established a 
framework in which pro se litigants would not only receive special 
consideration and guidance at the pleading stage, but also on procedural 
matters that arise over the course of litigation. The Breck court also 
determined that judges have a special obligation to inform pro se 
litigants “of the proper procedure for the action he or she is obviously 
attempting to accomplish.”96 
The Alaska Supreme Court was aware that such a regime of judicial 
 
 91.  With pro se litigants, as with under-performing lawyers, the judge must 
sometimes simply watch as the unskilled party goes down in flames regardless 
of the potential, but unsuccessfully articulated, merits of his case. See Burks v. 
State, 748 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (Coats, J., dissenting) 
(commenting on the pro se party’s right “to represent himself regardless of how 
bad an idea that might be for him”). 
 92.  404 U.S. 519 (1972). 
 93.  Id. at 520 (stating that the court will hold the pleadings of pro se litigants 
“to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”). See also 
Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008) (“Even in the formal 
litigation context, pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than 
other parties.”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“The handwritten pro 
se document is to be liberally construed.”). 
 94.  745 P.2d 66 (Alaska 1987). 
 95.  Id. at 75. 
 96.  Id. 
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generosity would potentially threaten a judge’s fundamental obligation 
to provide an impartial forum for the consideration of all litigants’ 
claims. Therefore, in Bauman v. State, Division of Family & Youth 
Services,97 the court limited the holding in Breck by declaring that “to 
instruct a pro se litigant as to each step in litigating a claim would 
compromise the court’s impartiality in deciding the case by forcing the 
judge to act as an advocate for one side.”98 Bauman required a litigant to 
make a genuine effort to learn and comply with procedural 
requirements before the court would extend leniency.99 Yet the court 
also provided the judge significant discretion on how much guidance to 
offer a pro se litigant.100 
Alaska Op. 93-1 makes no direct mention of the struggle of Alaska 
courts to deal with the rise of pro se litigants. However, implicit in most 
defenses of attorney ghostwriting is the claim that such undisclosed 
assistance will actually help those clients in the courts.101 As one 
proponent of ghostwriting puts the issue, “[p]ermitting ghostwriting so 
that complaints are adequately crafted levels the playing field. It also 
streamlines the litigation process by clarifying the issues and reducing 
the number of dispositive motions and responses.”102 Alaska Op. 93-1 
expresses confidence that ghostwriting will not foster unfairness, but is 
otherwise silent on how the practice will affect the administration of 
justice. 
As noted above, the major defense of attorney ghostwriting is that, 
despite relatively widespread condemnation by judges, the practice will 
do no harm and will positively benefit pro se plaintiffs and courts. 
Proponents offer little evidence of these proposed benefits and usually 
rest their case on general claims: for example, that ghostwriting will 
“streamlin[e] the litigation process by clarifying the issues and reducing 
the number of dispositive motions and responses.”103 There is 
preliminary evidence, however, that unbundled legal services provide 
little benefit to low-income clients.104 For this reason, proponents of the 
 
 97.  768 P.2d 1097 (Alaska 1989). 
 98.  Id. at 1099. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  See Shooshanian v. Dire, 237 P.3d 618, 622 (Alaska 2010) (“We review for 
abuse of discretion . . . decisions about guidance to a pro se litigant.”). 
 101.  Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1158. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  See Steinberg, supra note 10, at 490–95. Steinberg understandably goes to 
great lengths to emphasize the limitations of her study, and minimize its 
ultimate significance, but nonetheless concludes by encouraging an increase in 
full-service representation (or at least new experiments in unbundled services). 
Id. at 496–97, 500. 
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practice tend to focus their arguments on the idea that the harms of 
ghostwriting are unfounded.  
Alaska Op. 93-1 adopts a view shared by many proponents, which 
is that ghostwritten filings will be obvious to the judge, who may then 
adjust his treatment of the pro se litigant accordingly.105 In a recent 
opinion, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility wholeheartedly endorsed this view by incorporating a 
lengthy passage from an article by one of ghostwriting’s principal 
proponents.106 The passage is worth quoting at length, both because it is 
crucial to the ABA’s argument and because it expresses the view 
adopted in part by Alaska Op. 93-1:107 
Practically speaking . . . ghostwriting is obvious from the face 
of the legal papers filed, a fact that prompts objections to 
ghostwriting in the first place. . . . Thus, where the court  sees 
the higher quality of the pleadings, there is no reason to apply 
any liberality in construction because liberality is, by definition, 
only necessary where pleadings are obscure. If the pleading can 
be clearly understood, but an essential fact or element is 
 missing, neither an attorney-drafted nor a pro se-drafted 
complaint should survive the motions. A court that refuses to 
dismiss or enter summary judgment against a non-
 ghostwritten pro se pleading that lacks essential facts or 
elements commits reversible error in the same manner as if it 
refuses to deny such dispositive motions against an attorney-
drafted complaint.108 
The ABA’s argument is premised on two crucial assumptions. First, 
it assumes that ghostwriting is always (or at least usually) obvious 
“from the face of the legal papers.”109 Second, it assumes that a judge 
will competently manage a case regardless of whether or not she 
perceives a ghostwritten product.  
That ghostwriting is facially obvious is undoubtedly true in most 
 
 105.  See Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1157 (suggesting that ghostwriting 
will be obvious in the higher quality of pleadings, so the court will not have a 
reason to construe such pleadings liberally). 
 106.  ABA Op. 07-446, supra note 39, at 3. 
 107.  See Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at n.2 (The opinion notes “that judges 
are usually able to discern when a pro se litigant has received the assistance of 
counsel in preparing or drafting pleadings. In that event, the Committee believes 
that any preferential treatment otherwise afforded the litigant will likely be 
tempered, if not overlooked.”). Indeed, Goldschmidt cites part of this footnote in 
support of his view. Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1157 n.68. 
 108.  Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1157–58 (citation omitted). 
 109.  ABA Op. 07-446, supra note 39, at 3. 
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cases, especially where the pro se litigant is marginally literate110 or has 
not availed himself of any technical legal assistance whatsoever. 
However, an alternative and increasingly likely case is not hard to 
imagine. If the number of reasonably well-educated pro se litigants who 
are motivated by beliefs and desires other than the hard necessities of 
poverty111 continues to rise, and they are resourced by increasingly well-
funded legal self-help centers and do-it-yourself websites, then these 
litigants might reasonably produce filings that have the look and feel of 
a “lawyerly” product. 
This possible alternative becomes even more plausible when one 
considers the relative quality (or lack thereof) of many attorney-
produced pleadings. Even a modest amount of experience with the sorts 
of pleadings often filed with the courts teaches that attorneys often 
produce pleadings that are confused and confusing.112 Whether due to 
rushed circumstances or marginal competence, many attorneys produce 
documents that “on their face” could be mistaken for the products of 
intelligent non-lawyers who have acquired some rudimentary facility 
with legal language, probably through the imitation of statements found 
in similar documents.113 Against this background, it is not hard to 
imagine a pro se litigant who is able to feign legal knowledge sufficient 
to produce a passable brief.114 The significance of this possibility is that it 
 
 110.  See Alteneder, supra note 24, at 5–8 (discussing the challenge of marginal 
literacy for Alaska courts). 
 111.  See Swank, supra note 28, at 1574 (noting various reasons for the growth 
of pro se litigation, including increased literacy rates and education, mistrust of 
the legal system, a desire to avoid legal fees, do-it-yourself-ism, and a belief that 
many forms of litigation have been sufficiently simplified) (citations omitted). 
 112.  What Judge Learned Hand had to say about this matter in 1921 is 
doubtlessly true today: 
I dare say that an ingenious actuary might find upon irrefragable 
computation that in general loss of time, misprision of judges, 
consequent appeals, discouragement of suitors and the like, the annual 
loss to our country through bad pleadings equaled the cost of four new 
battleships, or complete refashioning of primary education. 
GERARD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 123 (2010). 
 113.  A long history of “jailhouse” lawyering has taught that non-lawyers, 
given time, determination, and some resources, can produce what look like the 
products of low-level (or even not-so-low-level) lawyers. See Ellis v. Maine, 448 
F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971) (recognizing that sometimes pro se litigants who 
claim complete ignorance of the law present briefs written by someone with 
legal knowledge but not certified by the bar). 
 114.  See id. (“In a growing number of petitions . . . the Petitioner . . . presents 
a brief which, however insufficient, was manifestly written by someone with 
some legal knowledge.”). Here, contrary to Goldschmidt’s use of this case, the 
“someone with some legal knowledge” could easily be a smart pro se litigant 
who took advantage of the resources in his local court’s litigation self-help 
center. But see Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1157 n.68 (using the same quote to 
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makes a competent pro se pleading seem to the judge like it is based on 
genuine legal understanding when it is not. This misapprehension 
would then threaten to obfuscate the very basis of the judge’s generous 
treatment of pro se litigants: a recognition of the “categorical disparity 
between the [unrepresented and represented] parties’ abilities to obtain 
a just resolution to their dispute.”115 If the judge determines that she is 
dealing with a legally sophisticated pro se litigant, then she is 
potentially going to afford that litigant less leeway later in the litigation 
process, especially in dispositive motions and responses or in the 
associated hearings. 
This leads to the second major assumption: that a judge’s 
perception of a ghostwritten product will have no adverse effects on the 
judge’s management of the case. Proponents argue that competent, or 
mostly competent, pleadings will require no special leniency whether 
they are produced by a pro se litigant or an attorney.116 Professor Jona 
Goldschmidt, of Loyola University Chicago, defends this argument by 
interpreting the liberal pleading standard for pro se litigants announced 
in Haines v. Kerner117 as essentially no different than the standard 
previously announced for represented litigants in Conley v. Gibson.118 On 
this view, despite the plain language in the Haines decision that the 
Court holds the pleadings of pro se litigants “to less stringent standards 
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,”119 the difference in practice 
between the generosity appropriately extended to inadequate pleadings 
by represented or unrepresented parties is negligible.120 Goldschmidt 
 
support the proposition a court can discern a lawyer’s hand in drafting legal 
documents). 
 115.  See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1369 (9th Cir. 1985) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting) (cited in Cynthia Gray, Reaching Out or Overreaching: Judicial Ethics 
and Self-Represented Litigants, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 97, 103 n.15 
(2007)). 
 116.  See Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1157 (discussing the lack of necessity 
for leniency where pleadings are of higher quality). 
 117.  404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). 
 118.  See Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1155 (“[A]ll pleadings, pro se or 
otherwise, are entitled to the liberal pleading rules of Conley v. Gibson”); 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (holding a complaint may not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless “it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him 
to relief”). 
 119.  Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. 
 120.  Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1155. There is recent evidence that after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), there has 
been a substantial increase in the rate of dismissal of pro se complaints. See 
Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter 
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 615 (2010) (observing a substantially greater 
increase in the rate of dismissal of pro se suits than represented suits post-Iqbal). 
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argues: 
If the pleading can be clearly understood, but an essential fact 
or element is missing, neither an attorney-drafted nor a pro se-
drafted complaint should survive the motions. A court that 
refuses to dismiss or enter summary judgment against a non-
ghostwritten pro se pleading that lacks essential facts or 
elements commits reversible error . . . .121 
The implication of this line of argument is that a judge’s duty to 
extend special consideration to a pro se litigant essentially ends if that 
litigant’s pleadings rise to a certain level of adequacy. An adequately 
crafted pleading “levels the playing field” such that a judge may 
withdraw her solicitude for the pro se litigant and adopt a more neutral 
posture toward the contending litigants.122 
This argument is largely persuasive, though it contradicts the plain 
language (borrowed from Haines) that courts use to describe their 
approach to pro se pleadings.123 The problem, however, is that the 
argument is excessively confident about a judge’s ability to withdraw 
solicitude at the pleading stage without curtailing the kinds of lenient 
treatment that pro se litigants will still deserve under the relevant 
standards of judicial conduct. The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion otherwise 
critical of ghostwriting, pointed toward this issue when it stated that 
“the mere assistance of drafting, especially before a trial court, will not 
totally obviate some kind of lenient treatment due a substantially pro se 
litigant.”124 The Tenth Circuit did not explain what kind of ongoing 
 
This influence of “plausibility pleading” on pro se complaints strikes at least one 
commentator as a great threat to the Haines regime of special consideration for 
pro se litigants because it opens the gates for lower court judges to dismiss 
prima facie “conclusory” claims without doing the extra work of seeing whether 
they nonetheless put a legal matter at issue. See Rory K. Schneider, Illiberal 
Construction of Pro Se Pleadings, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 623 (2011). Schneider 
identifies potential relief from this problem for pro se litigants in Erickson v. 
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), where the Court admonished lower 
courts for dismissing allegations as conclusory when they were adequate to “put 
the[] matters in issue.” Schneider, supra, at 625. 
 121.  Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1157. 
 122.  See id. at 1158 (suggesting that ghostwriting puts parties on a level 
playing field and streamlines litigation “by clarifying issues and reducing the 
number of dispositive motions”). 
 123.  See Schneider, supra note 120, at 586–90 (discussing the travails of the 
court’s effort to distinguish between liberal, heightened liberal, and plausibility 
pleading standards in relation to different classes of litigants and different kinds 
of cases). One lesson to take away is that such distinctions are extremely 
complicated to manage in practice. 
 124.  Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citing 
Rothermich, supra note 26, at 2712). 
RHODES_V10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2013 12:24 PM 
254 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 30:2 
lenient treatment would be at issue or how the perception of assistance 
in drafting would affect it. Perhaps the most important area where pro 
se litigants will require special treatment is in dispositive motions or 
hearings after the pleading stage or in preparation for an appeal. It is in 
these later stages that misperceptions of a pro se litigant’s sophistication 
fostered by attorney ghostwriting may cause potential pitfalls for pro se 
litigants and the judges who must manage them. 
Under Alaska law, a judge’s struggle to serve appropriately a pro 
se litigant only begins with the pleadings. Alaska judges hold “the 
pleadings of pro se litigants . . . to less stringent standards than those of 
lawyers” but also inform those litigants “of the proper procedure for the 
action he or she is obviously attempting to accomplish.”125 However, as 
the judge moves from construing pleadings to providing procedural 
guidance, she labors under the danger identified by the Alaska Supreme 
Court in Bauman: “to instruct a pro se litigant as to each step in litigating 
a claim would compromise the court’s impartiality in deciding the case 
by forcing the judge to act as an advocate for one side.”126 The judge 
thus shares the predicament of Goldilocks: how to find the amount of 
solicitude for a pro se litigant that is neither too much, nor too little, but 
just right. In each case involving a pro se litigant, the judge must 
consider carefully what the pro se party is attempting to accomplish, 
why the litigant is failing, and where he is confused or missing the 
point. The judge must then intervene appropriately (neither too much 
nor too little). The scope of a judge’s duty to provide guidance is a 
matter of discretion—it changes with every pro se litigant. In each case, 
a judge must consider the pro se litigant’s concrete efforts and actions127 
as well as his relative ability to know and understand the rules of the 
game he is playing.128 By failing to exercise discretion properly, the 
judge may commit an injustice against one or the other litigant in the 
case.129 
 
 125.  Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987). 
 126.  Bauman v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 768 P.2d 1097, 1099 
(Alaska 1989). 
 127.  See, e.g., Kaiser v. Sakata, 40 P.3d 800, 804 (Alaska 2002) (“Had Kaiser, as 
a pro se litigant, made a good faith effort to obtain discovery and informed the 
court of his difficulties, he might have been entitled to greater guidance from the 
court regarding the mechanics of the discovery process.”). 
 128.  See Noey v. Bledsoe, 978 P.2d 1264, 1269–70 (Alaska 1999) (finding that 
the pro se litigant was sufficiently sophisticated to understand the procedural 
obligations he was under and take appropriate steps to fulfill them without 
additional judicial solicitude). 
 129.  See Burks v. State, 748 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (Coats, J., 
dissenting) (reasoning that a litigant who was found incapable of representing 
himself at trial, yet was allowed to do so, was an abuse of discretion by the 
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The desire to minimize the number of conflicting and confusing 
signals in this effort to manage appropriately pro se litigants may 
explain why some Florida judges thought that the simple fact of 
disclosing attorney assistance would be beneficial in their efforts to 
serve these litigants.130 No Alaska case addresses this difficulty directly, 
but an examination of several instances of the appellate review of a trial 
judge’s discretionary treatment of pro se litigants helps clarify the space 
of potential problems. Consider first Collins v. Arctic Builders,131 where 
the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that “the superior court must inform a 
pro se litigant of the specific defects in his notice of appeal and give him 
an opportunity to remedy those defects.”132 In this case, the pro se 
plaintiff attempted to appeal a worker’s compensation claim, but failed 
to comply with several procedural rules.133 The superior court dismissed 
the claim and the supreme court reversed, declaring that the failure of 
the lower court to provide procedural allowances was “manifestly 
unreasonable and thus constitute[d] an abuse of discretion.”134 The 
lower court purportedly dismissed the claim because it believed that to 
do otherwise would give the pro se litigant an advantage not afforded to 
the represented party.135 In response, the supreme court stated that it 
was “not concerned that specificity in pointing out the technical defects 
in pro se pleadings will compromise the superior court’s impartiality.”136 
The key to the decision in Collins is that a pro se litigant’s efforts to 
comply with procedural requirements triggers the mandated forms of 
judicial solicitude.137 The pro se litigant’s effort to comply is important 
because it indicates good faith,138 while the failure on technicalities 
indicates that the reason for failure was an inadequate understanding of 
 
court). 
 130.  See Florida Op. 79-7, supra note 13 (mentioning that judges “believed 
that disclosure of professional legal assistance would prove beneficial” in cases 
where a lawyer’s help goes beyond merely filling out forms for pro se litigants). 
 131.  957 P.2d 980 (Alaska 1998) (per curiam). 
 132.  Id. at 982. The court in Collins made this determination under the rule in 
Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987), which incorporated the Haines 
standard into Alaska law. 
 133.  Collins, 957 P.2d at 981. 
 134.  Id. at 982. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  In Coffland v. Coffland, 4 P.3d 317 (Alaska 2000), the court refused to find 
an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s management of a pro se litigant because 
the litigant failed “to cooperate with the trial court or to request assistance in 
complying with its orders. A pro se litigant must make some attempt to comply 
with the court’s procedures before receiving the benefit of the court’s leniency.” 
Id. at 321. 
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procedural requirements rather than an attempt to game the system. In 
more recent opinions, the Alaska Supreme Court has stressed that a pro 
se litigant “is expected to make a good faith attempt to comply with 
judicial procedures and to acquire general familiarity with and attempt 
to comply with the rules of procedure—absent this effort, [the litigant] 
may be denied the leniency otherwise afforded pro se litigants.”139 
The judge’s special treatment of pro se litigants is not limited to 
“pointing out technical defects.” In Worthington v. Worthington,140 the 
supreme court determined that the trial court judge in a child custody 
modification suit acted within his discretion by providing (or attempting 
to provide) substantial assistance to the pro se litigants.141 In 
Worthington, the trial judge confronted a pro se litigant who continually 
responded to crucial questions with “conclusory statements.”142 When 
asked by the litigant what types of evidence the court would like to hear, 
the judge explained that he required specifics and some statement of 
relevant facts.143 The judge also summarized in clear terms what he 
understood the plaintiff to be saying (supposedly, clarifying the 
litigant’s confused claims), provided additional time for testimony, and 
even asked substantive questions regarding the children’s preferences 
and other related matters.144 On review, the supreme court determined 
that this kind of assistance—extending well beyond procedural 
technicalities—borders on an improper compromise of impartiality, but 
remains within the superior court’s appropriate discretion.145 
The easy cases under this rule involve litigants who simply do not 
make an effort to comply with procedural requirements at all. This was 
the case in Bauman, where the court declined “to extend Breck to require 
judges to warn pro se litigants on aspects of procedure when the pro se 
litigant has failed to at least file a defective pleading.”146 The more 
difficult cases involve a sophisticated litigant whose failure to comply 
with procedural requirements was actually a combination of foot-
dragging and litigation strategy. In Noey v. Bledsoe,147 for example, the 
court held that Noey, a “sophisticated pro se litigant,”148 did not deserve 
 
 139.  Gilbert v. Nina Plaza Condo Ass’n, 64 P.3d 126, 129 (Alaska 2003) (citing 
Kaiser v. Sakata, 40 P.3d 800, 803 (Alaska 2002)). 
 140.  No. S-13982, 2011 WL 3795532 (Alaska Aug. 24, 2011). 
 141.  Id. at *6. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Bauman v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 768 P.2d 1097, 1099 
(Alaska 1989). 
 147.  978 P.2d 1264 (Alaska 1999). 
 148.  Id. at 1269. 
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procedural leniency for his petition for a stay on the eve of trial. Taken 
in the abstract, Noey’s action seemed paradigmatic of the sort of 
procedural mishap that the court should accommodate under Breck. In 
this instance, however, the court’s judgment of Noey’s relative 
sophistication—exhibited in various ways throughout the litigation 
process—was influential in determining that he should be held to an 
appropriately strict procedural standard.149 
Abstracting from the particular facts of Noey, one can see the 
potential for how a judge’s mischaracterization of a pro se litigant’s 
sophistication could lead the judge to withdraw leniency when it is truly 
deserved. Imagine an “educated and articulate” pro se litigant who 
brings a personal injury suit against the other driver, represented by an 
attorney, in the wake of a car accident.150 The judge finds the pro se 
litigant’s pleadings confusing, but suggestive of a modicum of legal 
knowledge. She suspects that the pleadings are “ghostwritten” by an 
attorney, but is uncertain based on her experience with intelligent 
laypersons who acquire rudimentary knowledge of legal claims and 
language, as well as with the relatively low quality of many lawyers’ 
work. Similarly, at trial, the judge finds that the pro se litigant seems to 
understand many procedural requirements—enough so that she again 
suspects he was prepped by an attorney prior to trial—but is clearly 
confused by others. Mixed signals abound. The judge struggles 
throughout the trial to balance her obligation to explain procedural 
requirements and make other allowances for the pro se litigant with her 
obligation to maintain an impartial forum for both parties. She explains 
some procedural issues at length (though remains unsure about the 
extent to which the litigant truly understands), while on others she 
“tempers or overlooks”151 her preferential treatment of the pro se litigant 
in an effort to be fair to the opposing party’s lawyer. She finds the 
balancing act unnecessarily irritating. On review, the appellate court 
determines that while her efforts to guide the pro se litigant do not 
amount to plain error, she should have provided the litigant a “more 
 
 149.  Id. at 1269–70. 
 150.  The hypothetical that follows is based very loosely on Azimi v. Johns, 254 
P.3d 1054 (Alaska 2011), where the Alaska Supreme Court reviewed a superior 
court’s decision with respect to whether, inter alia, the trial court judge was 
adequately attentive to the needs of the pro se litigant. The description of the 
litigant as “educated and articulate”—important at trial for determining the 
ability of the litigant to understand the procedural requirements he was under—
is found at p. 1066. 
 151.  See Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1, at 2 n.2 for the view that a judge, 
suspecting undisclosed assistance from an attorney for a pro se litigant, will 
temper or “overlook[]” any preferential treatment to the pro se party in the 
interest of fairness. 
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complete” explanation of the proper procedures.152 
The burden on judicial discretion in these situations is real enough 
and cannot be adequately addressed by more explicit guidance from the 
supreme court. Given differences among individual pro se litigants and 
the cases they bring, the supreme court seems to have decided that the 
regime of Breck modified by Bauman is as clear as the guidance for 
judicial discretion can become without unduly hampering it with more 
specific rules.153 Much is at stake in the judge’s exercise of discretion, 
both for the judge’s effort to do justice on the merits and for the pro se 
litigant. As the foregoing examination has suggested, the first 
impressions created by a pro se litigant’s ghostwritten pleadings may 
influence the judge’s efforts throughout the subsequent litigation 
process. The judge’s potential mischaracterization of the litigant’s 
sophistication may lead her to draw back the amount of guidance she 
provides in a way that ultimately harms the litigant’s chances of success. 
Requiring attorneys who assist otherwise pro se litigants to disclose 
their assistance is not a comprehensive solution to the challenges 
confronting judges managing pro se litigants. Such a disclosure will not, 
for instance, enable a judge accurately to determine how much a pro se 
litigant truly understands, and thus to judge whether the litigant’s 
inadequate efforts and explanations are evasive tactics or good faith 
failures. Disclosure will, however, ensure that the judge exercises her 
discretionary effort to balance solicitude and impartiality in a situation 
where all of the relevant variables are clear. The judge will not be 
confronted with conflicting signals about a pro se litigant’s actual 
understanding of his claims and the requirements he is under, nor will 
the judge be required to guess about the sources of a litigant’s 
knowledge. 
IV. ATTORNEY GHOSTWRITING: HIGH COST, LOW REWARD 
One of the most poignant retorts against critics of ghostwriting is 
that they fail to identify any particular harm that the practice causes to 
 
 152.  See Azimi, 254 P.3d at 1062 (“We agree that the superior court could have 
provided Azimi with a more complete explanation of the proper procedure . . . 
[but] we hold that any deficiency in the court’s explanation was harmless.”). 
 153.  Though this is speculation, it is reasonable to infer this conclusion from 
the fact that, in Tracy v. State, Dept. of Health & Soc. Servs., 279 P.3d 613, 617 
(Alaska 2012), where the court requested supplemental briefing on the proper 
extent of a judge’s required solicitude for the needs of a pro se litigant, the court 
simply reiterated the Breck and Bauman standards to justify its determination 
that the lower court did not abuse its discretion by declining to advise plaintiffs 
on what steps they might have taken to amend their complaint to name a proper 
defendant. 
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the legal profession or the administration of justice.154 The genius of the 
retort is that it shifts the burden of justification to critics of ghostwriting. 
For many years, most lawyers have assumed that this kind of disclosure 
is required by ARPC 3.3 concerning “candor to the tribunal,” or under 
the duty of honesty imposed by ARPC 1.2(d), 4.1, or 8.4(c).155 As a more 
general matter, most lawyers assume that norms of disclosure and 
transparency are deeply embedded in the practice of law, subject only to 
the duty of protecting a client’s confidences or secrets.156 Until recently, 
few lawyers would have agreed that an attorney’s participation in 
aspects of an ongoing litigation should be concealed from the court.157 
The previous sections of this Note have attempted to take seriously 
the demand by proponents of ghostwriting that its critics identify the 
harms associated with the practice. The argument thus far has suggested 
that ghostwriting (1) undermines the transparency that allows the courts 
and other lawyers to monitor for abuses of the rules of professional 
conduct, and (2) potentially impairs the efforts of judges to address the 
needs of pro se litigants. The argument is to some extent speculative, 
concerned with a future in which unbundled services and pro se 
litigation are an even greater part of legal practice in the United States. 
In this respect, however, the argument is on par with most defenses of 
ghostwriting. The suggested benefits of allowing ghostwriting for low-
income pro se litigants are also largely speculative.158 Most defenses of 
ghostwriting essentially claim that because the practice has not yet 
produced any real harm, it should be permitted to continue because it 
 
 154.  See generally Jona Goldschmidt, An Analysis of Ghostwriting Decisions: Still 
Searching for the Elusive Harm, 95 JUDICATURE 78, 10 (2011) (noting “the lack of 
documented harm to adverse parties in ghostwriting decisions” and the “lack of 
published cases of documented harm or adversary disadvantage from 
ghostwriting”). 
 155.  ALASKA R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3. See also ALASKA R. OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (“A lawyer shall not counsel or assist a client to engage in 
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”); ALASKA R. OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (mandating that a lawyer shall not falsely state material 
facts or law or “fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to 
avoid assisting” a client’s criminal or fraudulent act); ALASKA R. OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (stating that conduct “involving fraud, dishonesty, deceit, or 
misrepresentation” constitute acts of professional misconduct). 
 156.  See ALASKA R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (requiring lawyers to protect 
client confidences and secrets, unless a client provides informed consent, or the 
disclosure is necessary to prevent harm, crime, fraud, or injury). 
 157.  But see ABA Op. 07-446, supra note 39, at 3 (noting that since no 
reasonable concern exists that a pro se litigant will receive an unfair advantage 
from “behind-the-scenes” legal assistance, such aid is “immaterial and need not 
be disclosed”). 
 158.  See Steinberg, supra note 10, at 13 (mentioning evidence that unbundled 
services in general are providing no demonstrable benefit to pro se litigants). 
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might improve the prospects of low-income litigants. ABA Op. 07-446 
justifies ghostwriting primarily on the idea that it is immaterial to the 
merits of the litigation and will not provide a pro se litigant an undue 
advantage.159 The ABA opinion does not, however, seem concerned—as 
several of the Florida judges were160—that ghostwriting will provide 
cover for incompetent, predatory practices by lawyers who sell their 
services to low-income individuals and then provide them ineffective 
assistance. 
For the defense of ghostwriting to be fully persuasive, proponents 
must not simply argue that it is immaterial or innocuous, but actually 
explain what ghostwriting promises to contribute to the larger 
aspiration of unbundled services. The defense of ghostwriting can no 
longer simply be a defense of the basic idea of unbundled services. As 
noted above, the Alaska debate over unbundled services has been 
settled in its favor. The question that needs to be addressed is whether 
ghostwriting adds anything of value to the practice that can outweigh 
the potential costs. There is no evidence, for instance, that states 
permitting ghostwriting have a larger number of attorneys providing 
unbundled or pro bono services. More generally, ghostwriting fosters an 
atmosphere of suspicious motives. An attorney who refuses to provide 
limited services unless it is undisclosed would at least seem to be trying 
to create a situation in which he cannot be held accountable for the 
quality of his work. Similarly, a client who wants the services of an 
attorney to remain confidential seems to be trying to game the system by 
seeking the supposed advantages of proceeding pro se. 
Goldschmidt has identified eight reasons why attorneys or their 
clients may want to conceal their relationship from the court and 
opposing counsel.161 Framing these concerns in relation to a purported 
right to confidentiality, he argues that ghostwriting would be 
appropriate: 
(1) where an attorney is a friend of both the pro se litigant and 
his divorcing spouse or other adversary in a civil dispute; (2) 
where the attorney may not want the adverse  publicity from 
public knowledge that he represents a particularly unpopular 
pro se client;  (3) where the pro se client knows that the judge in 
the case and his ghostwriting attorney  do not have a good 
relationship, and he does not want the disclosure to adversely 
 
 159.  ABA Op. 07-446, supra note 39, at 3. 
 160.  See Cofer Letter, supra note 82 (highlighting the danger of attorneys 
involving themselves in cases in a limited manner, which can result in pro se 
litigants misconstruing or misapplying attorney advice). 
 161.  Goldschmidt, supra note 41, at 1198. 
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affect  his case; (4) where the attorney who provides 
ghostwriting services because he is  sympathetic to pro se 
litigants seeks to avoid ostracism for that service by members 
of his bar association or judges with anti-pro se attitudes; (5) 
where the attorney wants to assist  the pro se client, but does 
not want to get involved in the matter because opposing 
counsel is particularly uncivil or a user of hardball tactics that 
he fears will lengthen the  litigation needlessly; (6) where the 
attorney knows his client will not have the funds to litigate the 
case fully and he wants to avoid being forced to stay in the case 
by a judge who may decide that, once he appears, his 
withdrawal motion should be denied; (7)  where the attorney is 
employed by a private company or non-profit organization and 
wants to assist a pro se friend in a legal matter, but does not 
want his employer to know  that he is representing the pro se 
litigant on his own time; (8) where the attorney may not desire 
to appear before the assigned judge because of a problem with 
him in the past,  he knows that if he appears and files a notice of 
substitution of judge the other side will do the same thing, and 
the third judge may be worse than the first, so—given the 
 client’s ability to pay—ghostwriting and coaching the litigant 
may be in the client’s best interest.162 
All of these reasons are understandable concerns. Some are based 
on personal conflicts of interest (not amounting to concerns under ARCP 
1.7), others on a lawyer’s concern with the public perception of his work. 
However understandable these reasons are for causing particular 
lawyers in particular situations to be reticent about becoming involved 
with a specific pro se client, none of them are adequate justifications for 
permitting ghostwriting as a general policy. None of these situations—if 
addressed by a general policy of allowing ghostwriting—promises to 
increase the number of attorneys providing unbundled or pro bono 
services. 
CONCLUSION 
Alaska Op. 93-1 justifies ghostwriting as a way of enabling lawyers 
to serve more low-income individuals that is harmless for the judiciary’s 
effort to manage an impartial and effective forum for justice.163 There is 
no evidence that ghostwriting increases the number of attorneys 
providing unbundled legal services or makes providing those services 
 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Alaska Op. 93-1, supra note 1. 
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any easier. Similarly, there is no evidence that ghostwriting improves 
the prospects of pro se litigants once they are in court. This Note has 
argued that ghostwriting confuses the interaction between pro se 
litigants and judges in a way that potentially works against the pro se 
party’s interests. 
Given the marginal contribution, if any, that ghostwriting makes to 
legal services, the Alaska Bar Association should revise its ethical 
guidance to require that any attorney-assisted filing submitted by an 
otherwise pro se litigant be identified as such. The Alaska Bar 
Association could follow the Florida Bar Association’s lead and require 
that attorneys who provide such services append “Prepared with the 
Assistance of Counsel, Alaska Bar No. _____.” Requiring attorneys to 
identify their work products in this manner would neither discourage 
them from assisting pro se clients nor stifle experimentation in the 
unbundled services market. What such disclosure would do is 
incentivize quality legal work because it would preserve and protect 
crucial forms of oversight and accountability. This disclosure would also 
help the Alaska legal community monitor for abuses so that the quality 
of legal representation for low-income, pro se litigants is consistent with 
that offered to the beneficiaries of more traditional representation. 
 
